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   1 Introduction
Existing models of team sports leagues assume that club owners maximize either
pro￿ts (El-Hodiri and Quirk, 1971; Fort and Quirk, 1995; Szymanski and KØsenne,
2004; Falconieri et al., 2004) or wins (KØsenne, 2000, 2006; Zimbalist, 2003; Fort
and Quirk, 2004; Vrooman, 2007). This assumption is restrictive and not supported
by evidence. In contrast, empirical evidence from North American major leagues
and European leagues supports the assumption that clubs trade o⁄pro￿ts and wins
(e.g., Atkinson et al., 1988; Garcia-del-Barrio and Szymanski, 2009).
Given this evidence, we present a contest model of a sports league in which
club owners maximize a utility function given by a weighted sum of pro￿ts and
winning percentage. As compared to previous analyses, this model is useful to
develop more general propositions. In particular, the model resolves much of the
controversy surrounding the famous invariance proposition (IP) of sports economics.
The IP may be regarded as a predecessor of the famous Coase theorem (see Fort,
2005). According to the IP, which was introduced by Rottenberg (1956), changes
in property rights, such as the introduction of a reserve clause, will not alter the
allocation of playing talent within a sports league and therefore will have no impact
on competitive balance. El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971), Fort and Quirk (1995) and
Vrooman (1995) have extended the IP to gate revenue sharing by showing that
revenue sharing has no e⁄ect on player allocation within a league. This result is
of huge importance to professional team sports in general and league managers
in particular because revenue sharing has been introduced as a means to increase
competitive balance. The optimal level of competitive balance is crucial for overall
demand and total revenues in professional sports as fans tend to prefer competitions
with uncertain outcomes.
The IP with respect to revenue sharing was originally developed under the as-
sumptions of purely pro￿t-maximizing clubs and Walrasian conjectures.1 KØsenne
(2000, 2005) and Vrooman (2007, 2008) show that the IP does not hold in a league
with purely win-maximizing clubs. Moreover, Szymanski and KØsenne (2004) pro-
vide a model that contradicts the IP even under the assumption of purely pro￿t-
maximizing clubs. They show that under contest-Nash conjectures, revenue sharing
1The Walrasian conjectures dti=dtj = ￿1 have been applied in the traditional literature (El-
Hodiri and Quirk, 1971; Fort and Quirk, 1995; Rascher, 1997) for leagues with a ￿xed supply of
talent. These conjectures indicate that clubs internalize that due to the ￿xed amount of talent,
a one-unit increase of talent hired at one club implies a one-unit reduction of talent at the other
club. The recent literature, however, proposes the use of the contest-Nash conjectures dti=dtj = 0
to characterize non-cooperative behavior between clubs (Szymanski, 2003, 2004; Szymanski and
KØsenne, 2004). For a discussion regarding the Walrasian and Nash conjectures, see Szymanski
(2004), Eckard (2006), and Fort and Quirk (2007).
2does not increase but rather decreases competitive balance: see also Dietl and Lang
(2008), Vrooman (2008), and Grossmann et al. (2009). This result is driven by
the so-called "dulling e⁄ect" of revenue sharing. According to the dulling e⁄ect,
revenue sharing reduces the incentives for clubs to invest in playing talent because
each club has to share some of the resulting marginal bene￿ts of its talent invest-
ment with the other clubs in the league.2 Dietl et al. (2009) con￿rm the dulling
e⁄ect of revenue sharing in a league in which one club is a pure pro￿t maximizer
and the other club is a pure win maximizer.
Our model has signi￿cant implications for competition authorities and legislators
because it derives new insights regarding the e⁄ect of revenue sharing on investment
incentives and competitive balance. In contrast to traditional models, our analy-
sis shows that revenue sharing does not always reduce the incentives to invest in
playing talent. We identify a new e⁄ect of revenue sharing called the "sharpening
e⁄ect," which has the opposite e⁄ect of the well-known dulling e⁄ect. With our
model, we can determine the conditions under which the sharpening e⁄ect or the
dulling e⁄ect is at work. We show that in the presence of the sharpening e⁄ect
(dulling e⁄ect), revenue sharing enhances (reduces) investment incentives and im-
proves (deteriorates) competitive balance in the league. Moreover, we determine the
conditions under which the IP holds even under contest-Nash conjectures. Finally,
our model analyzes how a more win-orientated behavior of certain clubs a⁄ects
talent investments, competitive balance and club pro￿ts.
Revenue-sharing schemes are widely applied in professional sports leagues all
over the world. In the United States, one of the most prominent schemes is that
operated by the National Football League (NFL) in which the visiting club secures
40% of the locally earned television and gate receipt revenue. In 1876, Major League
Baseball (MLB) introduced a 50-50 split of gate receipts, which was reduced over
time. Since 2003, all clubs in the American League have placed 34% of their locally-
generated revenue (i.e., gate revenues, concession revenues, television revenues and
so on) into a central pool, which is then divided equally among all the clubs. The
National Basketball Association (NBA) and the National Hockey League (NHL)
also operate with a pool-sharing arrangement. In the Australian Football League
(AFL), gate receipts were at one time split evenly between the home and the visiting
team. This 50-50 split was ￿nally abolished in 2000.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our
basic model without revenue sharing. In Section 3, we introduce a revenue-sharing
arrangement and analyze its e⁄ect on talent investment and competitive balance.
Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2See also Cyrenne (2009).
32 The Basic Model
2.1 Notation and Assumptions
We model a two-club league in which both clubs participate in a non-cooperative
game and independently invest a certain amount xi 2 R+ in playing talent. The
di⁄erence of our model from traditional models of professional sports leagues is
that, in our model, the club objective function is such that clubs maximize a utility
function given by a weighted sum of pro￿ts and wins.3
The win percentage wi of club i is characterized by the contest-success function
(CSF), which maps the vector (x1;x2) of talent investment onto probabilities for
each club. We apply the logit approach, which is probably the most widely-used
functional form of a CSF in sporting contests.4 The win percentage of club i = 1;2 in





with i;j = 1;2; i 6= j. Given that win percentages must sum to unity, we obtain
the adding-up constraint: wj = 1 ￿ wi. In our model, we adopt the contest-
Nash conjectures
dxi





The uncertainty of outcome is measured by the competitive balance in the
league. One way of measuring competitive balance is through the ratio of win
percentages, which is also called win ratio (Hoehn and Szymanski, 1999; Vrooman,
2007, 2008). Without loss of generality, we de￿ne the win ratio by the ratio of club





Note that the win ratio WR equals one in a fully balanced league. A win ratio that
is lower or higher than one thus indicates a league with a lower degree of competitive
balance.
Following the sports economic literature, we specify the revenue function of club
3One exception is Rascher (1997), who assumes that clubs maximize a linear combination of
pro￿ts and wins. However, the crucial di⁄erence with respect to our model is that Rascher (1997)
applies Walrasian conjectures and assumes a ￿xed supply of talent in the league.
4The logit CSF was generally introduced by Tullock (1980) and was subsequently axiomatized
by Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998). Alternative functional forms include the probit
CSF (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Dixit, 1987) and the di⁄erence-form CSF (Hirshleifer, 1989). See
Dietl et al. (2008) and Fort and Winfree (2009) for analyses of the CSF￿ s discriminatory power in
sporting contests.
4i = 1;2 as5





where b > 0 characterizes the e⁄ect of competitive balance on club revenues and
mi 2 R+ represents the market size parameter of club i.
It is important to mention that club i￿ s revenues initially increase with winning
until the maximum is reached for w0
i ￿
mi
b . By increasing the win percentage above
w0
i, club i￿ s revenues start to decrease because excessive dominance by one team is
detrimental to club revenues. This re￿ ects the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis;
the higher b is, the more important is competitive balance and the sooner revenues
start to decrease due to dominance by one team.
We further assume that clubs are heterogeneous with respect to their drawing
potential or market size mi. Without loss of generality, we assume throughout this
paper that club 1 is the large-market club with a high-drawing potential, while club
2 is the small-market club with a low-drawing potential such that m1 > m2. As a
consequence, the large-market club generates higher revenues than the small-market
club for given win percentages (w1;w2).
By assuming a competitive labor market, the market clearing cost of a unit of
talent, denoted by c, is the same for every club. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity,
we do not take into account non-labor costs and normalize the ￿xed capital cost to
zero.6 The cost function of club i = 1;2 is thus given by C(xi) = cxi, where c is
the marginal unit cost of talent.
The pro￿t function of club i = 1;2 is given by revenues minus costs and yields






(xi + xj)2 ￿ cxi; (4)
with i;j = 1;2; i 6= j.
As mentioned above, the utility function of club i is given by a weighted sum of
one￿ s own pro￿ts and wins; it is de￿ned as:
ui(xi;xj) = ￿i(xi;xj) + ￿iwi(xi;xj); (5)
where ￿i 2 R
+
0 is the "win preference", which characterizes the weight club owner
5This club-speci￿c revenue function is widely used in the sports economics literature. For
instance, our revenue is consistent with the revenue functions used in Hoehn and Szymanski
(1999), Szymanski (2003), Szymanski and KØsenne (2004), KØsenne (2006, 2007) and Vrooman
(2007, 2008).
6See Vrooman (1995) for a more general cost function or KØsenne (2007) for a cost function
with a ￿xed capital cost. Moreover, Grossmann et al. (2008) analyze the e⁄ect of revenue sharing
on competitive balance in the case of a convex cost function with constant marginal cost elasticity.
5i puts on winning in the utility function. A higher parameter ￿i thus re￿ ects that
club owner i becomes more win-orientated and less pro￿t-orientated.
Moreover, note that we have two dimensions of heterogeneity in our model. On
the one hand, clubs di⁄er with respect to their market size and on the other hand,
clubs di⁄er regarding their win preference. In the following sections, we analyze the
interaction e⁄ects of these two dimensions of heterogeneity.
2.2 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we solve the model and determine the equilibrium. Each club i



























￿ c = 0; (7)
with i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j. The solution to the above maximization problem is
presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 test
In a league with utility-maximizing clubs, the equilibrium investment and win per-





2 (￿j + mj)(m1 + ￿1 + m2 + ￿2 ￿ b)





m1 + ￿1 + m2 + ￿2
;
with i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j.
Proof. Straightforward and therefore omitted.
In order to guarantee positive equilibrium investments, we assume that either
the clubs￿market sizes or the win preferences are su¢ ciently large such that m1 +
￿1 + m2 + ￿2 > b.
Lemma 1 shows that ceteris paribus, the win percentage of club i increases with
either a higher win preference ￿i or a larger market size mi: i.e.,
@w￿
i
@￿i > 0 and
@w￿
i
@mi > 0. The opposite holds true if the market size mj or the win preference ￿j of
the other club increases: i.e.,
@w￿
i




6A comparison of the equilibrium investments of the two clubs leads to the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 1 test
In a league with utility-maximizing clubs, the small-market club invests more than
the large-market club if and only if m2 + ￿2 > m1 + ￿1.
Proof. Straightforward and therefore omitted.
In contrast to traditional models of sports leagues with pure pro￿t- and/or win-
maximizing clubs, in our model, it is possible that the small-market club invests
more in equilibrium and, as a consequence, is the dominant team that has a higher
win percentage than the large-market club.7 This outcome occurs if the utility
of the small-market club has a su¢ ciently high win preference parameter. In this
case, the win preference compensates for the lower market size such that marginal
revenue is higher for the small-market club than for the large-market club, ceteris
paribus. However, if the sum of market size and win preference of the large-market
club is larger than (equal to) the sum of market size and win preference of the
small-market club, then the former invests more than (the same as) the latter.
2.3 The E⁄ect on Competitive Balance
The e⁄ect of market sizes and win preferences on competitive balance in the league
is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 test






Therefore, if clubs become more win-orientated, competitive balance may increase or
decrease depending on the market size parameters (m1;m2) and the win preference
parameters (￿1;￿2) of the two clubs.
Proof. Straightforward and therefore omitted.
As a benchmark case, consider a league with pure pro￿t-maximizing clubs, i.e.,
￿1 = ￿2 = 0. In this league, the win ratio is given by WR￿ = m1=m2 > 1. We
know that in this case, the large-market club is the dominant team in equilibrium,
while the small-market club is the underdog. If the di⁄erence in the market size of
7One exception is Grossmann and Dietl (2009), who show in a dynamic two-period contest
model that an equilibrium exists in which the small club invests more than the large club in both
periods.
7the two clubs increases (decreases), the win ratio WR￿ increases (decreases): thus,
the league becomes less (more) balanced. This result is well known in the sports
economics literature (Fort and Quirk, 1995; Vrooman, 1995; Szymanski, 2003).
However, if the club owner of at least one club becomes more win-orientated
(i.e., ￿1 > 0 and/or ￿2 > 0), then the league may become more or less balanced
than in the benchmark case with pure pro￿t-maximizing clubs. To illustrate this
result, consider the following three cases.
(i) The large-market club has a positive win preference and the small-market
club is a pure pro￿t-maximizer: i.e., ￿1 > 0 and ￿2 = 0. In this case, the league is
less balanced than in the benchmark case, and competitive balance decreases if the
large-market club becomes more win-orientated (i.e., ￿1 increases).
(ii) The large-market club is a pure pro￿t-maximizer and the small-market club
has a positive win preference: i.e., ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 > 0. In this case, the league
is more balanced than in the benchmark case if and only if the win preference of
the small-market club is su¢ ciently small, i.e., ￿2 < ￿0
2 ￿ m2
1=m2 ￿ m2. Moreover,
competitive balance increases if the small-market club becomes more win-orientated,
i.e., ￿2 increases. If, however, ￿2 > ￿0
2, then the league is characterized by a lower
degree of competitive balance. Note that the small-market club is the dominant
team, and competitive balance decreases with a higher win preference ￿2 of the
small-market club.
(iii) Both clubs have a positive win preference: i.e., ￿1 > 0 and ￿2 > 0. As
in case (ii), the league is more balanced than in the benchmark case if and only
if the win preference of the small-market club is su¢ ciently small, i.e., ￿2 < ￿00
2 ￿
[m1(m1 + ￿1)]=m2￿m2. However, if ￿2 > ￿00
2, then the league is less balanced than
in the benchmark case with the small-market club being the dominant team.
2.4 The E⁄ect on Club Pro￿ts
In this section, we determine how the win preferences a⁄ect aggregate club pro￿ts in
a league with utility-maximizing clubs. For this purpose, we normalize the market-
size parameters as follows: m1 ￿ m and m2 ￿ 1, with m > 1. Moreover, we set
b = 1. We concentrate on two cases. In case (i), the large-market club is a pure
pro￿t-maximizer, and the small-market club has a positive win preference: i.e.,
￿1 = 0 and ￿2 > 0. In case (ii), the large-market club has a positive win preference,
and the small-market club is a pure pro￿t-maximizer: i.e., ￿1 > 0 and ￿2 = 0.8
8Regarding the e⁄ect on utility, one can show that the utility of club i increases with its win
preference parameter ￿i and decreases with the win preference parameter ￿j of the other club. The
e⁄ect on aggregate utility in the league, however, is ambiguous and depends on the parameters
(￿i;mi). In particular, in the case of ￿1 > 0 and ￿2 = 0, aggregate utility in the league always
8For case (i), we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3 test
Suppose that ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 > 0. Aggregate club pro￿ts decrease when the small-
market club becomes more win-orientated (i.e., ￿2 increases).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Consider a league in which the large-market club is a pure pro￿t-maximizer,
while the small-market club has a positive win preference: i.e., ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 > 0.
If the small-market club becomes more win-orientated, then the win percentages
of the small-market club increases, whereas the win percentage of the large-market
club decreases (see discussion after Lemma 1). It follows that the revenues of the
small-market club increase, while the revenues of the large-market club decrease
through a higher win preference of the small-market club: i.e., @R￿
2=@￿2 > 0 and
@R￿
1=@￿2 < 0.9 Moreover, the small-market club increases its investment in playing
talent, which induces higher costs for this club. The increase in revenues, however,
cannot compensate for the increase in costs such that pro￿ts of the small-market
club decrease. The large-market club, on the other hand, decreases or increases
its talent investment, i.e., @x￿
1=@￿2 R 0 , m(m ￿ 1) R ￿2
2 ￿ 1. But even if the
large-market club￿ s costs decrease due to smaller investments, club pro￿ts decrease
as well because the lower costs cannot compensate for the lower revenues. Since
pro￿ts of both types of clubs decrease, aggregate club pro￿ts also decrease.
For case (ii), we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 4 test
Suppose that ￿1 > 0 and ￿2 = 0. Aggregate club pro￿ts increase when the large-
market club becomes more win-orientated (i.e., ￿1 increases) if and only if the mar-
ket size of the large-market club is su¢ ciently large.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Consider a league in which the large-market club has a positive win preference,
while the small-market club is a pure pro￿t-maximizer: i.e., ￿1 > 0 and ￿2 =
0. In contrast to the proposition above, a higher win preference ￿1 yields higher
revenues for the large-market club due to a higher win percentage in equilibrium.
The opposite holds true for the small-market club. Moreover, talent investment and
thus costs are always higher for the large-market club, whereas talent investment
increases if the large-market club becomes more win-orientated, whereas in the case of ￿1 = 0
and ￿2 > 0, the e⁄ect on aggregate utility is ambiguous if the small-market club becomes more
win-orientated.
9Note that the revenue function of club i = 1;2 is a strictly increasing function on the interval
wi 2 [0;1] for b = 1.
9are lower for the small-market club if and only if the market size of the large-market
club is su¢ ciently large with m > m0 ￿ 2 ￿ ￿1. Even though costs may decrease
for the small-market club, the loss in revenues is so substantial that the pro￿ts of
the small-market club always decrease.
In contrast, the pro￿ts of the large-market club increase if the market size of the
large-market club is su¢ ciently large such that (m+￿1)[m(m + ￿1 ￿ 2) ￿ 4￿1] > ￿1
is satis￿ed. In this case, higher revenues compensate for higher costs. If the market
size of the large-market club further increases above another threshold given by
m00 ￿ 1=2
￿
3 ￿ ￿1 + [(￿1 + 1)(￿1 + 9)]
1=2
￿
> m0, the higher pro￿ts of the large-
market club compensate for the lower pro￿ts of the small-market club, and aggregate
club pro￿ts increase.10
3 The E⁄ect of Revenue Sharing in a League with
Utility-Maximizing Clubs
In this section, we integrate a gate revenue-sharing arrangement into our model and
analyze its e⁄ects in a league with utility-maximizing clubs. The sharing of gate
revenues plays an important role in the redistribution of revenues and has long been
accepted as an exemption from antitrust law (Fort and Quirk, 1995; Szymanski,
2003). The basic idea of this cross-subsidization policy is to redistribute revenues
from large-market clubs to small-market clubs because large-market clubs have a
higher revenue-generating potential than do small-market clubs.
In its simplest form, gate revenue sharing allows the visiting club to retain a
share of the home club￿ s gate revenues. The after-sharing revenues of club i are
given by b Ri = ￿Ri + (1 ￿ ￿)Rj, with i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j. Note that the share of
revenues that is assigned to the home team is given by the parameter ￿ 2 [1=2;1],
while (1 ￿ ￿) is assumed to be the share of revenues received by the away team.
Thus, the utility of club i in a league with utility-maximizing clubs is given
by b ui = b Ri ￿ cxi + ￿iwi. Maximizing utility b ui yields the following maximization






















with i;j = 1;2; i 6= j.
10In a league in which both clubs have a positive win preference (i.e., ￿1 > 0 and ￿2 > 0)
a higher win preference ￿2 for the small-market club always yields lower pro￿ts for both clubs.
The e⁄ect of a higher win preference ￿1 for the large-market club on club pro￿ts, however, is
ambiguous.










































2 ￿ c = 0;
We determine the equilibrium win percentages in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 test
In a league with utility-maximizing clubs and a revenue-sharing arrangement, the




￿i + ￿(mi ￿ b) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)mj + b
(m1 + m2)(2￿ ￿ 1) + 2b(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿1 + ￿2
; (11)
with i;j = 1;2; i 6= j.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.










￿1 + ￿(m1 ￿ b) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)m2 + b
￿2 + ￿(m2 ￿ b) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)m1 + b
T 1: (12)
As in a league without revenue sharing, the small-market club invests more in
equilibrium and consequently has a higher win percentage than the large-market
club if and only if the sum of the market size and win preference for the small-market
club is larger than that for the large-market club: i.e., m2+￿2 > m1+￿1.11 In this
case, we obtain d WR
￿
< 1. If, however, m2 + ￿2 ￿ m1 + ￿1, then the large-market
club does not invest less than the small-market club, i.e., d WR
￿
￿ 1.
Regarding the e⁄ect of revenue sharing on club revenues, we compute the partial
derivative of club i￿ s marginal revenue MRi = @ b Ri=@wi with respect to the revenue-






2(m1 + m2 ￿ b) T 0; (13)
11Note that this condition does not depend on the revenue-sharing parameter ￿.
11with i;j = 1;2; i 6= j. We derive that a higher degree of revenue sharing (i.e., a
lower parameter ￿) has a positive e⁄ect on club i￿ s marginal revenue if b > m1+m2,
while it has a negative e⁄ect on marginal revenue if b < m1 + m2. In the case that
b = m1 + m2, revenue sharing has no e⁄ect on marginal revenue.
To further analyze the e⁄ect of revenue sharing on competitive balance, we







[b ￿ (m1 + m2)][(m1 + ￿1) ￿ (m2 + ￿2)]
(￿2 + ￿(m2 ￿ b) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)m1 + b)
2 T 0: (14)
In equilibrium, the e⁄ect of revenue sharing on the win ratio and the incentives to
invest depends on how revenue sharing a⁄ects marginal revenue (i.e., b T m1 +m2)
as well as on which club is the dominant team in equilibrium (i.e., m1+￿1 T m2+￿2).
We proceed by di⁄erentiating three cases.12 In Section 3.1, revenue sharing has
a positive e⁄ect on marginal revenue: i.e., b > m1 + m2. In Section 3.2, revenue
sharing has a negative e⁄ect on marginal revenue: i.e., b < m1 + m2. Finally, in
Section 3.3, revenue sharing has no e⁄ect on marginal revenue: i.e., b = m1 + m2.
3.1 The Sharpening E⁄ect of Revenue Sharing
The integration of a win preference parameter ￿i for club i allows that the case in
which revenue sharing has a positive e⁄ect on marginal revenue is a feasible equi-
librium outcome. Without a win preference parameter, the parameter constellation
b > m1 + m2 would not constitute an equilibrium. This parameterization implies
that in equilibrium, the win percentage b w￿
1 of the large-market club and/or the win
percentage b w￿
2 of the small-market club are higher than the revenue-maximizing win
percentages w0
1 = m1=b and/or w0
2 = m2=b. In this case, the marginal revenue of
club 1 and/or club 2 would be negative, which is not feasible in equilibrium. The
negative marginal revenue, however, can be compensated by additional marginal
revenue through the integration of a win preference parameter ￿i. Due to this ad-
ditional e⁄ect with respect to the marginal revenue of investment, the parameter
constellation b > m1 + m2 is feasible in equilibrium.
In the case that revenue sharing has a positive e⁄ect on marginal revenue, we
establish the following proposition.
Proposition 5 test
Suppose that b > m1+m2. In a league with utility-maximizing clubs, a higher degree
of revenue sharing will:
12Note that we only have to consider marginal revenue in order to generate insights regarding
the equilibrium conditions, as marginal costs are constant and independent of revenue sharing.
12(a) increase the amount of talent hired by each club, and
(b) increase competitive balance if either the small-market club or the large-
market club is the dominant team in equilibrium. In the case that both clubs have
equal playing strength in equilibrium, the IP holds.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
With respect to part (a) and in contrast to the established literature,13 this
proposition shows that revenue sharing does not necessarily reduce incentives to
invest in playing talent. If revenue sharing has a positive e⁄ect on marginal revenue
for both clubs, then a higher degree of revenue sharing enhances incentives to invest
in playing talent, and both clubs will increase the amount of talent hired in equilib-
rium. Thus, we identify a new e⁄ect of revenue sharing that we call the "sharpening
e⁄ect." Note that this sharpening e⁄ect of revenue sharing has the opposite e⁄ect
of the dulling e⁄ect described in Section 3.2.14
Furthermore, part (b) shows that in the presence of the sharpening e⁄ect, a
revenue-sharing arrangement proves to be an e¢ cient instrument for improving
competitive balance in an unbalanced league. We explain the intuition behind this
result as follows.
If the large-market club is the dominant team in equilibrium (i.e., d WR
￿
> 1),15
then the positive e⁄ect of revenue sharing on marginal revenue is stronger for the
underdog (i.e., small-market club) than for the dominant team (i.e., large-market
club) due to the logit formulation of the CSF. As a consequence, the sharpening
e⁄ect of revenue sharing is more pronounced for the underdog than for the dominant
team, since the (negative) marginal impact on the dominant team￿ s revenues of
an increase in talent investment by the underdog is greater than the (negative)
marginal impact on the underdog￿ s revenues of an increase in talent investment
by the dominant team. As a consequence, the small-market club will increase its
investment level relatively more than the large-market club such that the league
becomes more balanced through revenue sharing.
If, however, the small-market club is the dominant team in equilibrium (i.e.,
d WR
￿
< 1 , m1 + ￿1 < m2 + ￿2), then the positive e⁄ect of revenue sharing on
marginal revenue is stronger for the large-market club than for the small-market
club. In this case, the sharpening e⁄ect of revenue sharing is stronger for the large-
market club. Again, the underdog (in this case, the large-market club) will increase
its investment level relatively more than the dominant team (in this case, the small-
13See Szymanski (2003), Szymanski and KØsenne (2004), Cyrenne (2009) and Dietl et al. (2009).
14The dulling e⁄ect describes the well-known result in sports economics that revenue sharing
reduces the incentive to invest in playing talent (see Szymanski and KØsenne, 2004).
15Remember that d WR
￿
> 1 holds if and only if m1 + ￿1 > m2 + ￿2.
13market club) such that the league becomes more balanced through revenue sharing.
In the case that the league is already perfectly balanced (i.e., both clubs have
equal playing strength in equilibrium such that d WR
￿
= 1), the (marginal) sharp-
ening e⁄ect of revenue sharing is equally strong for both clubs. As a consequence,
both clubs will marginally increase their investment level at an equal rate and com-
petitive balance will not be altered through revenue sharing such that the IP holds.
3.2 The Dulling E⁄ect of Revenue Sharing
In the case that revenue sharing has a negative e⁄ect on marginal revenue, we
establish the following proposition:
Proposition 6 test
Suppose that b < m1+m2. In a league with utility-maximizing clubs, a higher degree
of revenue sharing will:
(a) reduce the amount of talent hired by each club, and
(b) decrease competitive balance if either the small-market club or the large-
market club is the dominant team in equilibrium. In the case that both clubs have
equal playing strength in equilibrium, the IP holds.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Part (a) shows that each club reduces the amount of talent hired in equilibrium
if revenue sharing has a negative e⁄ect on marginal revenue of both clubs in equi-
librium. That is, in this case, the well-known dulling e⁄ect of revenue sharing is
present.
Part (b) shows that a revenue-sharing arrangement will worsen the competitive
balance in an already unbalanced league if revenue sharing has a negative e⁄ect
on marginal revenue. With a similar argumentation as above, this dulling e⁄ect is
more pronounced for the underdog than for the dominant team, since the (positive)
marginal impact on the dominant team￿ s revenues of a decrease in talent investment
by the underdog is greater than the (positive) marginal impact on the underdog￿ s
revenues of a decrease in talent investment by the dominant team. If the large-
market club is the dominant team in equilibrium, then the small-market club will
reduce its investment level relatively more than the large-market club such that the
league becomes less balanced through revenue sharing. This replicates the result of
Szymanski and KØsenne (2004).
If, however, the small-market club is the dominant team in equilibrium, then
the dulling e⁄ect of revenue sharing is stronger for the large-market club than for
the small-market club. In this case, the large-market club will reduce its investment
14level relatively more than the small-market club. As a result, the league becomes
again less balanced through revenue sharing.
In the case that the league is already perfectly balanced, the (marginal) dulling
e⁄ect is equally strong for both clubs such that both clubs will marginally decrease
their investment level at an equal rate. As a consequence, competitive balance will
not be altered through revenue sharing, and the IP holds again.
3.3 No E⁄ect of Revenue Sharing
In the case that revenue sharing has no e⁄ect on marginal revenue, we establish the
following proposition.
Proposition 7 test
Suppose that b = m1+m2. In a league with utility-maximizing clubs, a higher degree
of revenue sharing has no e⁄ect on equilibrium investment such that the IP holds.
Proof. See proof of Proposition 5.
The proposition shows that revenue sharing has no e⁄ect on talent investment,
and thus, it does not change the level of competitive balance in the league if revenue
sharing has no e⁄ect on marginal revenue. As a consequence, the IP with respect
to revenue sharing holds even under contest-Nash conjectures. Note that up until
now, the IP has been derived only under Walrasian conjectures.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a contest model of a sports league and introduce a
more general objective function for club owners by assuming that clubs maximize
a weighted sum of pro￿ts and wins. This approach fundamentally di⁄ers from
traditional analyses of sports leagues, which assume either pure pro￿t-maximizing
and/or win-maximizing clubs. Evidence from the real world of major sports leagues,
however, suggests that clubs trade o⁄ pro￿ts and wins.
Our model has signi￿cant implications for competition authorities and legisla-
tors because it provides new insights regarding the e⁄ect of revenue sharing on
investment incentives as well as determines the conditions under which revenue
sharing increases or decreases competitive balance. The model also analyzes how
more win-orientated behavior of certain clubs a⁄ects talent investment, competitive
balance and club pro￿ts. In particular, we show that the small-market club will be
the dominant team in equilibrium and will invest more than the large-market club
if the small-market club has a su¢ ciently high preference for winning. In this case,
15the resulting incentive e⁄ect to invest in playing talent compensates for the size ef-
fect. The e⁄ect of more win-orientated behavior of certain clubs on the competitive
balance in the league is ambiguous and depends on the market-size parameters and
the win preferences. We further show that aggregate club pro￿ts decrease with a
more win-orientated behavior on the part of the small-market club in a league in
which the large-market club is a pure pro￿t-maximizer. On the other hand, in a
league in which the small-market club is a pure pro￿t-maximizer, aggregate club
pro￿ts may increase through a more win-orientated behavior on the part of the
large-market club.
Regarding the e⁄ect of revenue sharing, our analysis shows that contrary to
traditional models, revenue sharing may enhance incentives to invest in playing
talent. Thus, we identify a new e⁄ect of revenue sharing called the "sharpening
e⁄ect", which has the opposite e⁄ect of the well-known dulling e⁄ect. As a con-
sequence, revenue sharing may increase or decrease competitive balance, or it may
have no e⁄ect on competitive balance such that the invariance proposition (IP)
holds. The e⁄ect of revenue sharing on competitive balance depends on (i) which
club has a higher win percentage and thus is the dominant team in equilibrium,
and (ii) whether the sharpening or dulling e⁄ect of revenue sharing is at work. The
following table summarizes the results.







b > m1 + m2 CB increases IP holds CB increases
b < m1 + m2 CB decreases IP holds CB decreases
b = m1 + m2 IP holds IP holds IP holds
Remember that the sharpening e⁄ect is present if revenue sharing has a positive
e⁄ect on marginal revenue (i.e., b > m1 +m2), whereas the dulling e⁄ect is present
if revenue sharing has a negative e⁄ect on marginal revenue (i.e., b < m1 + m2). If
b = m1 + m2, then revenue sharing has no e⁄ect on marginal revenue. Also recall
that in equilibrium the sharpening or dulling e⁄ect is always more pronounced for
the underdog than for the dominant team.16 As a consequence, the e⁄ect of revenue
sharing on competitive balance crucially depends on whether the sharpening e⁄ect
or the dulling e⁄ect is at work.
16Note that the large-market club is the dominant team in equilibrium if m1 + ￿1 > m2 + ￿2,
whereas the small-market club is the dominant team in equilibrium if m1 + ￿1 < m2 + ￿2. The
league is perfectly balanced if m1 + ￿1 = m2 + ￿2.
16Table 1 shows that, in the presence of the sharpening e⁄ect (dulling e⁄ect),
revenue sharing will improve (deteriorate) competitive balance if the league is not
yet fully balanced. This holds true independent of which club is the dominant
team in equilibrium. In the case in which the league is already fully balanced in
equilibrium (i.e., both clubs have the same win percentage), then revenue sharing
has no e⁄ect on competitive balance, and the IP holds. The IP also holds if revenue
sharing has no e⁄ect on marginal revenue, independent of whether the league is
already fully balanced.
An interesting avenue for further research in this area is the analysis of salary
restrictions (caps and ￿ oors). A salary cap (￿ oor) puts an upper (lower) bound
on a club￿ s payroll and have been introduced as a measure to improve competitive
balance in sports leagues. Salary restrictions are widely applied in professional
sports leagues all over the world. In the NHL, for example, each team had to
spend between US$ 34.3 million and 50.3 million on player salaries in the 2007-08
season. In the NFL, the salary cap in 2009 is approximately US$ 128 million per
team, whereas the salary ￿ oor was 87.6% of the salary cap, which is equivalent to
US$ 112.1 million. The AFL also operates with a combined salary cap and ￿ oor:
for 2009, the salary cap was ￿xed at A$ 7.69 million, the ￿ oor at 7.12 million.17
Our model framework can be used to analyze the e⁄ect of such salary restrictions
on competitive balance, talent investment, and club pro￿ts in sports leagues with
utility-maximizing clubs.
17The data is taken from the collective bargaining agreements of the respective leagues.
17A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that m1 = m and m2 = 1 with m > 1 and b = 1. Moreover, consider
a league in which the large-market club is a pure pro￿t-maximizer and the small-
market club has a positive win preference, i.e., ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 > 0. In this scenario,
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(1 + ￿2)m(1 + ￿2 + 2￿2m + 2m2)
c(1 + ￿2 + m)4 > 0;
for all c > 0, m > 1 and ￿2 > 0.
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2) + (1 + ￿2)2 ￿ 2m2￿2)
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m((1 + ￿2)2 + m2(1 + 2￿2) + m(￿2(2￿2 + 1) ￿ 1)
(m + ￿2 + 1)4 < 0;
for all c > 0, m > 1 and ￿2 > 0. This means that pro￿ts of the small-market
club and the large-market club always decrease with a higher win preference ￿2. It
follows that aggregate club pro￿ts also decrease. This completes the proof of the
proposition.
18A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that m1 = m and m2 = 1 with m > 1 and b = 1. Moreover, consider a
league in which the large-market club has a positive win preference and the small-
market club is a pure pro￿t-maximizer, i.e., ￿1 > 0 and ￿2 = 0. In this scenario,
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1 + 3(m + ￿1)
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(m + ￿1)[m(m + ￿1 ￿ 2) ￿ 4￿1] ￿ ￿1
(m + ￿1 + 1)4 > 0 , (m+￿1)[m(m + ￿1 ￿ 2) ￿ 4￿1] > ￿1:
The inequality is satis￿ed for m su¢ ciently large.







(m + ￿1 + 1)4 < 0;
for all c > 0, m > 1 and ￿2 > 0.
The partial derivative of aggregate club pro￿ts with respect to the win preference






m(m + ￿1 ￿ 3) ￿ 4￿1
(m + ￿1 + 1)3 > 0 , m(m + ￿1 ￿ 3) > 4￿1:
The last inequality is satis￿ed for m > m00 ￿ 1=2
￿




19This completes the proof of the proposition.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
































5 ￿ c = 0
Combining both equations and rearranging yields
(x1 + x2)(x2r ￿ x1s + bx2 ￿ bx1) = 0
In equilibrium (x￿
1;x￿









￿1 ￿ m2(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿(m1 ￿ b) + b














￿i + ￿(mi ￿ b) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)mj + b
(m1 + m2)(2￿ ￿ 1) + 2b(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿1 + ￿2
with i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j. This completes the proof of the lemma.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Part (a) We claim that the e⁄ect of more revenue sharing on talent investments
depends on how revenue sharing a⁄ects marginal revenue in equilibrium. In this
proof, we will show that a higher degree of revenue sharing (i) decreases equilibrium
investment of each club if b < m1+m2, (ii) increases equilibrium investment of each
club if b > m1 + m2, and (iii) has no e⁄ect on equilibrium investment of each club
if b = (m1 + m2).
To prove this claim, we derive the total di⁄erential of the ￿rst-order conditions
@b u1























20For notational convenience, we write:
@2b u1
@x2
1 = b u11,
@2b u1
@x2@x1 = b u12,
@2b u1




2 = b u22,
@2b u2
@x1@x2 = b u21,
@2b u2








The total di⁄erential of the ￿rst-order conditions from above can also be written
as "
b u11 b u12
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x1+x2 = (m1 + m2 ￿ b)
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b u12b u2￿ ￿ b u22b u1￿





b u21b u1￿ ￿ b u11b u2￿
b u11b u22 ￿ b u12b u21
(16)
In order to ensure a maximum, we need the stability condition b u11b u22 ￿b u12b u21 > 0.
Therefore, the denominator has to be positive (see, e.g., Dixit, 1986 and Szymanski
and KØsenne, 2004).
The sign of the numerator depends on how revenue sharing a⁄ects marginal
revenue. We di⁄erentiate three cases:
(i) Assume that b < m1 + m2. In this case, b u1￿ > 0 and b u2￿ > 0.
(ia) If club 1 is the dominant team in equilibrium, i.e., w1 > w2, then b u12 > 0
and thus the numerator b u12b u2￿ ￿ b u22b u1￿ of
dx1
d￿ is positive. It follows that
dx1
d￿ > 0,
i.e., revenue sharing induces the dominant team (club 1) to decrease its investment.
Since revenue sharing decreases competitive balance,18 the underdog (club 2) has
to decrease its investment as well, i.e.
dx2
d￿ > 0.
(ib) If club 2 is the dominant team in equilibrium, i.e., w2 > w1, then b u21 > 0 and
thus the numerator b u21b u1￿ ￿ b u11b u2￿ of
dx2
d￿ is positive. It follows that that
dx2
d￿ > 0,
i.e., revenue sharing induces the dominant team (club 2) to decrease its investment.
18See part (b) of Proposition 6.
21Since revenue sharing decreases competitive balance, the underdog (club 1) has to
decrease its investment as well, i.e.
dx1
d￿ > 0.
(ii) Assume that b > m1 + m2. In this case, b u1￿ < 0 and b u2￿ < 0.
(iia) If club 1 is the dominant team in equilibrium, i.e., w1 > w2, then b u12 > 0
and thus the numerator b u12b u2￿ ￿ b u22b u1￿ of
dx1
d￿ is negative. It follows that
dx1
d￿ < 0,
i.e., revenue sharing induces the dominant team (club 1) to increase its investment.
Since revenue sharing increases competitive balance,19 the underdog (club 2) has to
increase its investment as well, i.e.
dx2
d￿ < 0.
(iib) If club 2 is the dominant team in equilibrium, i.e., w2 > w1, then b u21 > 0
and thus the numerator b u21b u1￿ ￿ b u11b u2￿ of
dx2
d￿ is negative. It follows that
dx2
d￿ < 0,
i.e.,revenue sharing induces the dominant team (club 2) to increase its investment.
Since revenue sharing increases competitive balance, the underdog (club 1) has to
increase its investment as well, i.e.
dx1
d￿ < 0.
(iii) Assume that b = m1+m2. In this case, b u1￿ = 0 and b u2￿ = 0. It immediately




d￿ = 0. That is, revenue sharing
has no e⁄ect on talent investments.
Part (b) Suppose that b > m1 + m2. We claim that a higher degree of revenue
sharing increases competitive balance if either the small-market club or the large-
market club is the dominant team in equilibrium. In the case that both clubs have
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2
The sign of @ d WR
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2(m1 +m2 ￿b) < 0:
It follows that a higher degree of revenue sharing (i.e., a lower parameter ￿) implies
higher marginal revenue for both clubs.
We di⁄erentiate three cases:
(i) Assume that m1 + ￿1 = m2 + ￿2. In this case, it is easy to see that revenue
sharing has no e⁄ect on competitive balance and the IP holds, since @ d WR
￿
@￿ = 0.
(ii) Assume that m1+￿1 > m2+￿2. In this case, the large-market club 1 invests







￿ ￿ since x1 > x2, such that the positive
19See part (b) of Proposition 5.
22e⁄ect of revenue sharing on marginal revenue is stronger for the small-market club.
Therefore, d WR
￿
> 1 decreases and competitive balance increases if revenue sharing
increases.
(iii) Assume that m1+￿1 < m2+￿2. In this case, the small-market club 2 invests







￿ ￿ since x2 > x1, such that the positive
e⁄ect of revenue sharing on marginal revenue is stronger for the large-market club.
Therefore, d WR
￿
< 1 increases and competitive balance increases if revenue sharing
increases.
This completes the proof of the proposition.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Part (a) Note that we have proven the claim already in Proposition 5.
Part (b) Suppose that b < m1 + m2. We claim that a higher degree of revenue
sharing decreases competitive balance if either the small-market club or the large-
market club is the dominant team in equilibrium. In the case that both clubs have
equal playing strength in equilibrium, the IP holds.
As in the proof of Proposition 5, the sign of @ d WR
￿
@￿ only depends on m1 + ￿1 S
m2 + ￿2. Note that
@MR1
@￿ > 0 and
@MR2
@￿ > 0 if b < m1 + m2. It follows that a
higher degree of revenue sharing (i.e., a lower parameter ￿) implies higher marginal
revenue for both clubs.
Again, we di⁄erentiate three cases:
(i) Assume that m1 + ￿1 = m2 + ￿2. In this case, it is easy to see that revenue
sharing has no e⁄ect on competitive balance and the IP holds, since @ d WR
￿
@￿ = 0.
(ii) Assume that m1 + ￿1 > m2 + ￿2. In this case, the large-market club 1
invests more in talent and thus has a higher win percentage than the small-market




@￿ since x1 > x2, such that the
negative e⁄ect of revenue sharing on marginal revenue is stronger for the small-
market club. Therefore, d WR
￿
> 1 increases even more and competitive balance
decreases if revenue sharing increases.
(iii) Assume that m1 + ￿1 < m2 + ￿2. In this case, the small-market club 2
invests more in talent and thus has a higher win percentage than the large-market




@￿ since x2 > x1, such that the
negative e⁄ect of revenue sharing on marginal revenue is stronger for the large-
market club. Therefore, d WR
￿
< 1 decreases even more and competitive balance
decreases if revenue sharing increases.
This completes the proof of the proposition.
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